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Education Reforms
Susanna Loeb and Patrick J. McEwan
6.1    Introduction
Over 55 million children and adolescents attend elementary and second-
ary schools in the United States, 89 percent in public schools. These students 
spend approximately 1,000 hours each year in schools across the country, 
for which local, state, and federal governments spend over $550 billion (Na-
tional Center for Education Statistics [NCES] 2008).1 Education is an inten-
sive and costly enterprise. It also has the potential to dramatically improve 
opportunities for students. In the United States, estimates of the return 
to an additional year of schooling are in the neighborhood of 10 percent, 
depending on the data and method (Card 1999).2 Educational attainment 
is also associated with diﬀerences in individual health, incarceration, and 
dependence on public assistance (Belﬁ  eld and Levin 2007). While schooling 
improves children’s lifetime opportunities, the debate on how to use scarce 
time and resources to maximize outcomes while in school is not settled.
Even so, the terms of debate have improved markedly from a time when 
researchers asked whether “money mattered” using mainly nonexperimental 
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1. See http:/  / nces.ed.gov/ pubs98/ yi/ y9638a.asp  for  data  on  hours.
2. Economists have long worried that estimates of the return to schooling do not have a 
causal interpretation. High- ability individuals may earn more, in addition to being more likely 
to continue in school, perhaps leading to a spurious association between schooling and wages. 
A large literature, including twins studies and other attempts to isolate exogenous variation in 
schooling, rarely suggest that the return to years of schooling is biased upward. Indeed, they 
frequently yield even larger estimated returns, perhaps because the methods estimate returns 
for a unique subpopulation (Card 1999).146        Susanna Loeb and Patrick J. McEwan
studies.3 In the last decade, the breadth and quality of education research 
has improved (Angrist 2004; Barrow and Rouse 2005). In the late 1990s, 
economists published inﬂ  uential reanalyses of experimental data on the 
impact of class size reduction in Tennessee (Krueger 1999) and private 
school vouchers in Milwaukee (Rouse 1998). The next ten years yielded 
even more and better research, catalyzed by three factors. First, the data 
improved, especially with collection of longitudinal administrative data on 
students in several U.S. states and cities (Loeb and Strunk 2003). Second, 
formerly hypothetical policies—especially related to choice and account-
ability—were implemented and studied with good research designs (Figlio 
and Ladd 2008; Zimmer and Bettinger 2008). Third, the U.S. Department 
of Education and other funders increasingly required the use of research 
designs able to yield credible causal ﬁ  ndings, especially randomized experi-
ments and regression-  discontinuity designs.
Education polices comprise a vast array of programs and approaches. To 
make our task manageable, we categorize them into one of three groups: 
(a) direct investments in schools, including school improvement grants and 
class size reductions; (b) interventions that target the teacher workforce 
through wages, recruitment, or professional development programs; and 
(c) interventions that aim to increase accountability and change decision- 
making in schools through either enhancing parental choice or increasing 
test-  based accountability. This chapter selectively reviews the high-  quality 
evidence on the eﬀects of diﬀerent approaches within each of these three 
groups.
6.2    Estimating  Policy  Eﬀects
Economists have traditionally used nonexperimental data to estimate 
education production functions, in which student test scores are regressed 
on a “kitchen sink” of explanatory variables. These include attributes of 
students and their families (e.g., ability and income), attributes of teach-
ers and schools (e.g., preservice training and expenditures), and attributes 
of peers and communities. The usual goal is to isolate the causal eﬀect of 
school inputs that can potentially be manipulated by school authorities. 
The empirical task is complicated by the fact that observed test scores are 
the cumulative result of investments by families and schools throughout a 
child’s life (Todd and Wolpin 2003). Only a fraction of these investments 
are observed in most data sets. It is common, in such cases, to include a 
lagged test score in regressions as an implicit control for prior family or 
school variables. Even if this does control for prior inﬂ  uences on test scores, 
3. The early, nonexperimental literature often showed little consistent evidence of correla-
tions between expenditures and achievement (Hanushek 1986, 2006), though others interpreted 
the same literature more optimistically (Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine 1996; Krueger 2003).Education Reforms    1 4 7
the models must fully control for contemporaneous factors associated with 
student participation in diﬀerent policies or programs, and this is very 
diﬃcult. Researchers are often left wondering whether their regressions 
eﬀectively adjust for the selection of diﬀerent students into diﬀerent policy 
environments.
Alternatively, researchers attempt to identify “clean” variation in policy 
variables (like class size) that is uncorrelated with unobserved variables that 
aﬀect test scores. In experiments, the researcher randomly assigns a subset 
of students, classrooms, or schools to receive a policy treatment and ran-
domly denies it to others. By design, in large studies, this randomization 
ensures that treated subjects are similar to untreated ones, except for their 
exposure to the policy, and that subsequent comparisons of outcomes will 
likely yield unbiased eﬀects. In a few cases, randomized assignment is a 
natural byproduct of program implementation, as in lotteries to allocate 
private school vouchers.
When randomization is not feasible, it is sometimes possible to identify 
variation in policy treatments that is “as good as random.” Among the many 
varieties of quasi- experiments, the regression- discontinuity design can yield 
convincing causal results (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002; Angrist and 
Krueger 1999). Treatments are assigned on the basis of a single variable and 
an assignment cutoﬀ (i.e., schools receive a program if their poverty rate is 
below a ﬁ  xed threshold, but not above). Assuming that schools or students 
on either side of the cutoﬀ are otherwise similar, comparisons of the two 
groups’ outcomes are a reasonable estimate of the causal eﬀect. It is akin to 
very local randomized experiment (Lee 2008).
When feasible, we focus on research that uses experimental and disconti-
nuity research designs. Still, it bears emphasis that our goal is to generalize 
these eﬀects beyond the immediate research setting and that doing so is 
sometimes more art than science. First, policy eﬀects may be heterogeneous 
across students. If eﬀects are heterogeneous, then randomized experiments 
succeed in identifying the average eﬀect among students (or occasionally 
within subgroups of students in large experiments). However, the research 
participants are often unique in ways that could increase or decrease their 
treatment eﬀects, relative to the typical student that the real-  world policy 
would eventually target. Experimental subjects often volunteer to be ran-
domly assigned, are drawn disproportionately from a particular race or 
income- level, or reside in compact geographic areas with unique institutions 
(e.g., school ﬁ  nance and accountability rules). 
Regression-  discontinuity studies may face a stricter version of this prob-
lem because they identify local average eﬀects for the subpopulation or stu-
dents or schools in the vicinity of the assignment cutoﬀ. Often this is policy 
relevant because decision- makers might raise or lower eligibility cutoﬀs. But 
for broader decisions about the cost- eﬀective targeting of resources, it would 
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far away from eligibility cutoﬀs (i.e., the poorest schools that qualify for 
Title I funds, rather than just-  poor-  enough schools).
Second, the best causal research is frequently conducted on a small scale. 
However, scaling up an intervention can provoke unanticipated general equi-
librium eﬀects. Sometimes this undermines a policy’s original objectives. The 
best-  known case in education is California’s statewide class size reduction 
in the late 1990s (Jepsen and Rivkin 2009), which sharply increased demand 
for teachers and may have lowered teacher quality in some schools. In other 
cases, the potential general equilibrium eﬀects in scale-  ups are of greater 
policy interest than the treatment eﬀects actually identiﬁ  ed in the small- 
scale research. For example, private school voucher experiments identify 
the eﬀects of private school attendance on the few students who are oﬀered 
vouchers. Yet most policymakers are at least as interested in how a large 
voucher oﬀer (and the concomitant reshuﬄing of students across schools) 
would aﬀect the outcomes of all students through increasing market com-
petition or school stratiﬁ  cation (Hsieh and Urquiola 2006; Hoxby 2000a).
6.3    Direct  Resource  Investments
The next sections review the best recent evidence on four types of direct 
resource investments (see table 6.1 for a summary of studies). First, we 
consider three policies that aﬀect the level of per-  pupil revenues or expen-
ditures in schools: the Federal Title I program which directs additional 
funds to high-  poverty schools; a California policy of school bonuses for 
high-  performing schools; and a range of school equity reforms that leveled 
up (or down) the expenditures in schools. Second, we brieﬂ  y review the 
experimental evidence on whether class size reduction increases test scores. 
Third, we review whether specialized instructional packages—often referred 
to as “whole- school” reforms—can raise test scores, focusing on the Success 
for All reading program. Fourth, we consider whether computer-  assisted 
instruction causes test score improvements.
6.3.1    Dollars
Title I is the largest Federal education program in K-  12 education, with 
$12 billion allocated in ﬁ  scal year 2005 (van der Klaauw 2008). Besides its 
scale, it is notable for its objective targeting of resources toward counties and 
schools with larger numbers of poor students. Title I’s distribution rule is 
intended to promote a transparent and well- targeted resource allocation, but 
it also facilitates a regression-  discontinuity design.4 van der Klaauw (2008) 
4. Similar evaluation strategies have been applied to programs in Chile and the Netherlands 
that allocated additional resources to schools based on measures of achievement or disadvan-
tage (Chay, McEwan, and Urquiola 2005; Leuven et al. 2007). The Chilean program found 
moderately positive test score eﬀects of intensive after-  school tutoring, while the Dutch pro-
gram found some negative eﬀects of extra funding for computers and software.Education Reforms    1 4 9
applies this strategy to school-  level data on New York City public schools. 
Schools with poverty rates below a threshold have sharply higher proba-
bilities of receiving Title I funds (about 5 percent of a school’s budget) but 
are otherwise similar to schools just above the threshold.5 The author ﬁ  nds 
that Title I designation did not produce achievement gains in 1993, 1997, 
or 2001 and may even have led to achievement declines in the earlier years. 
However, Title I schools also do not appear to have higher expenditures, 
perhaps because the state or local authorities remove other funds (for related 
evidence, see Gordon 2004). van der Klaauw (2008) further notes that a 
popular use for Title I funds was “pull- out” remedial instruction. Despite its 
easier compliance with federal rules, it has little demonstrated eﬀectiveness 
as an instructional strategy.
In 2000 and 2001, California oﬀered ﬁ  nancial rewards to schools that met 
speciﬁ  ed achievement targets (Bacolod, Dinardo, and Jacobson 2008). Upon 
winning, schools received one-  time, unrestricted bonuses that amounted to 
about 5 percent of per-  pupil expenditures. Though apparently intended for 
computers or other instructional purposes, it appears that most funds were 
returned to teachers in the form of bonuses. Using a discontinuity approach, 
Bacolod, Dinardo, and Jacobson (2008) compare subsequent achievement 
of schools that barely qualify for an award with those that barely miss one. 
After conﬁ  rming that schools above and below cutoﬀs are observationally 
similar, they ﬁ  nd no gains in student achievement.
Finally, we consider school ﬁ  nance reforms, which constitute one of most 
signiﬁ  cant attempts in the last thirty years to inﬂ  uence the resources available 
to schools enrolling disadvantaged children.6 Most reforms were mandated 
by state courts, following successful challenges to the state constitutionality 
of locally based systems of school ﬁ  nance. Because these “experiments” 
were initiated by courts and legislatures, and not researchers, their causal 
eﬀects are harder to identify. Corcoran and Evans (2008) compare the evolu-
tion of expenditures in states with and without reforms, ﬁ  nding that ﬁ  nance 
reforms typically reduced within-  state inequality in per-  pupil expenditures 
by 15 to 19 percent. Further, this does not appear to have occurred through 
a simple leveling down of higher-  spending schools.
Although one anticipates that additional resources should aﬀect student 
outcomes, there is mixed evidence on this fundamental question (Corcoran 
and Evans 2008). In a cross-  state analysis, Card and Payne (2002) ﬁ  nd that 
states with court-  mandated reforms experienced reductions in test score 
inequality, but the researchers are hampered by the use of SAT scores that 
5. One might be concerned that schools could manipulate poverty rates and their treatment 
status, but the eligibility cutoﬀ was not preannounced in this case, leaving little scope for stra-
tegic behavior (van der Klaauw 2008). Further, there is no evidence of discontinuities around 
the eligibility cutoﬀ in observed characteristics that inﬂ  uence outcomes.
6. Another class of ﬁ  nance reform, not considered here, is tax limitations, which removed 
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are taken by a subset of students. Other authors working with cross-  state 
data ﬁ  nd no eﬀects (Downes and Figlio 1998).
The most credible studies are typically conducted in a single or small num-
ber of states, but here, too, the evidence is conﬂ  icting (Corcoran and Evans 
2008). Researchers have found no eﬀect on test scores in Kentucky (Flana-
gan and Murray 2004) but found positive eﬀects on pass rates in Michigan 
(Papke 2005; Cullen and Loeb 2004). Of state-  speciﬁ  c studies, Guryan’s 
(2003) is one of the most convincing. His discontinuity study assesses how 
increased spending, induced by changes in the Massachusetts school fund-
ing formula, aﬀected test scores. Speciﬁ  cally, he relies on spending variation 
created when districts fall on one side or another of funding thresholds 
established by the formula. He ﬁ  nds that increasing per-  pupil expenditures 
by $500 per student,7 about half a standard deviation, yields tests score 
increases in fourth grade mathematics and reading of roughly 0.06 to 0.15 
standard deviations, respectively.8 The eighth grade test score results are also 
positive but not robust to alternative speciﬁ  cations.
6.3.2    Class  Size  Reduction
Given the popularity of class size reduction, there are surprisingly few 
high-  quality studies of its eﬀects on test scores. Researchers have focused 
on a large randomized experiment conducted in Tennessee during the 
mid-  1980s (Schanzenbach 2007).9 Within seventy-  nine volunteer schools, 
researchers randomly assigned students and teachers to “small” classes (thir-
teen to seventeen students) and “regular” classes (twenty- two to twenty- ﬁ  ve 
students).10 This treatment was maintained for four years (between kinder-
garten and third grade), though not all students participated in all years. 
For example, some new students entered the school after kindergarten, and 
a small proportion moved between classes within schools.
On average, the Tennessee results suggest that students who were initially 
assigned to smaller classes have test score gains of 0.15 standard deviations 
by the end of third grade, though similar achievement gains were already in 
evidence by the end of kindergarten. The eﬀects are even larger for the sub-
set of black students, or lower-  income students. In follow-  up studies, these 
eﬀects were much smaller and statistically insigniﬁ  cant by the end of eighth 
7. These appear to be 1996 dollars.
8. The coeﬃcient estimates are from the ﬁ  xed-  eﬀects speciﬁ  cation in column (2) of table 4. 
Guryan (2003) divides these coeﬃcients by the standard deviation of district-  level test score 
means, which tends to inﬂ  ate eﬀect sizes when between-  district test score variation is small. 
To make the eﬀect size comparable to others, and in the absence of a student-  level standard 
deviation of test score, we assume it to be (district-  level SD)/  sqrt (intradistrict correlation 
coeﬃcient), where the second term in parentheses is the proportion of variance in test scores 
accounted for by between-   rather than within-  district variation (What Works Clearinghouse 
2007). We assume it to be 0.2, which is likely overstated.
9. For earlier analyses of the Tennessee experiment, see Krueger (1999) and Krueger and 
Whitmore (2001).
10. They also considered a third group, consisting of regular classes with teachers’ aides.Education Reforms    1 5 3
grade. In a surprising ﬁ  nding, however, it appears that students eventually 
had a higher probability of taking a college entrance exam (0.02), again 
larger for black or lower-  income students.
Despite these ﬁ  ndings, reducing class size can be a costly endeavor. Fol-
lowing Schanzenbach (2007), we can assume that a seven- student reduction 
in the typical class size increased per- pupil expenditures ($10,551 in 2005) by 
47 percent, an annual per-  pupil increase of $4,959. The intervention lasted 
four years, but the average student participated for 2.3. Assuming a 3 percent 
discount rate and inﬂ  ating dollar estimates to 2007, the discounted per- pupil 
cost of the STAR intervention is $11,865. This is just under $16,000 per 0.2 
standard deviation gain in test scores (but just under $10,000 per 0.2 among 
black students).
As California’s experience has shown, general equilibrium factors could 
moderate potentially positive eﬀects of large- scale class size reduction. When 
California reduced class size in kindergarten through third grade across 
the state, new teaching positions opened up in traditionally easy-  to-  staﬀ 
schools, drawing teachers from other more diﬃcult- to- staﬀ schools. Schools 
with high shares of low- income and minority students saw a decrease in the 
proportion of teachers with prior teaching experience and full credentials 
(Jepsen and Rivkin 2009).
The results on the eﬀects of class size are also inconsistent across studies. 
As an example, Hoxby (2000b) ﬁ  nds no class size eﬀects in Connecticut, 
using diﬀerent quasi-  experimental approaches, including variation in class 
size driven by plausibly random changes in the size of local populations. She 
also implements a discontinuity analysis, using sharp decreases in class size 
caused when enrollments exceed speciﬁ  ed caps. The evaluation approach 
has been applied in several other countries, notably Israel (Angrist and Lavy 
1999) and Bolivia (Urquiola 2006), showing positive tests score eﬀects of 
reducing class size. Some doubt is cast on the collected discontinuity ﬁ  nd-
ings, however, because it is plausible that schools can manipulate the discrete 
assignment variable (school enrollment) in the vicinity of class size caps.11 
Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) provide concrete evidence of this in Chile, 
implying a scope for violations of the identifying assumptions of the dis-
continuity design in related settings.
6.3.3      Curriculum and Instructional Programs
To educators and parents, an obvious avenue for improving schools is to 
improve the curriculum and instruction oﬀered by schools. There are hun-
dreds of diﬀerent curricular and instructional reform approaches. Many are 
piecemeal add- ons to existing school programs, few of which are supported 
11. In contrast, it is less plausible that schools could precisely manipulate continuous assign-
ment variables, such as test scores because there is an error component that may ensure locally 
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by high-  quality studies. Some of these approaches, however, are whole- 
school reforms that consist of comprehensive and coordinated eﬀorts to 
overhaul the curriculum, instruction, technology, training, and other aspects 
of school operations (Levin 2002). These reforms are varied in their strate-
gies and goals, and only a few have been subjected to rigorous evaluation.
As an example, randomized experiments have assessed the eﬀectiveness 
of the School Development Program of James Comer, ﬁ  nding mixed results 
on student achievement (Cook et al. 1999; Cook, Murphy, and Hunt 2000). 
However, these experiments were hampered by relatively small samples 
of participating schools, which were the unit of randomization. A quasi- 
experimental, interrupted time- series analysis of Henry Levin’s Accelerated 
Schools Project showed positive eﬀects, but the study lacked an untreated 
comparison group to verify the robustness of these results (Bloom 2003). 
In New York City, researchers have compared achievement over time in a 
varied group of reform schools (without random assignment) to nonreform 
schools. This research yields mixed achievement results, and it is unclear 
whether nonreform schools are an adequate comparison group (Bifulco, 
Duncombe, and Yinger 2004; Schwartz, Stiefel, and Kim 2004).
To date, the most rigorous evaluation has been conducted on the Success 
for All reform, which focuses on improving reading skills. Success for All is 
a package of materials, training, and a scripted blueprint for implementing 
the program, generally targeted at high-  poverty and low-  achieving schools 
(Borman et al. 2007). In a random assignment study, forty- one schools were 
randomly assigned to apply the reform (or not) in early grades. After three 
years, the reading scores of students in Success for All treatment schools 
were 0.21 to 0.36 standard deviations higher than students in the control 
schools, depending on the test. Borman and Hewes (2002) estimate that 
Success for All has annual per-  pupil costs of $795 (in 2000).12 Assuming a 
discount rate of 3 percent in a three-  year intervention, and inﬂ  ating dollars 
to 2007, the discounted per-  pupil cost of the intervention is $2,789. Thus, 
depending on the eﬀect size estimate, it costs from $1,500 to $2,600 per 0.2 
standard deviations.
6.3.4    Computer-  Assisted  Instruction
Many countries and states have embarked on costly plans to increase 
the number of computers in schools, ranging from placement of comput-
ers in classrooms to thoughtful eﬀorts to integrate computers into schools’ 
instructional plans. A small number of high- quality studies have assessed the 
extent to which the latter eﬀorts have a causal eﬀect student learning. The 
mixed evidence suggests that results depend vitally on the program details.
12. Barnett (1996) reports slightly lower per-  pupil costs. They may underestimate full social 
costs because Success for All incurs opportunity costs for volunteering parents and existing 
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As examples, two randomized experiments have tested the eﬀects of the 
Fast ForWord program, a popular computer-  based approach to raising 
reading and language ability (Borman, Benson, and Overman 2009; Rouse 
and Krueger 2004). Neither ﬁ  nds meaningful eﬀects for the program. A 
large, federally funded randomized experiment also ﬁ  nds no eﬀects, using a 
diverse array of instructional products in both math and reading (Dynarski 
et al. 2007). This study randomly assigned teachers within 132 schools to use 
one of sixteen of computer- based approaches. After one year, there were no 
detectable test score eﬀects.
In contrast, a recent evaluation of a computer-  based algebra program 
(I Can Learn) found modest eﬀects on student test scores (Barrow, Mark-
man, and Rouse 2008). The researchers randomly assigned teachers (or class 
periods) within schools, roughly following the design of Dynarski et al. 
(2007), and identiﬁ  ed test score eﬀects of 0.17 standard deviations. Barrow, 
Markman, and Rouse (2008) calculate a per-  student intervention cost of 
$283 for a single variety of computer-  assisted instruction in math, or $333 
per 0.2 standard deviations.13 While encouraging, the mixed evidence on the 
eﬀects of computer- assisted instruction suggests that speciﬁ  c features of the 
treatment and its implementation play a decisive role in its success.
6.3.5    Summary
Research on direct investments in schools ﬁ  nds great variation in eﬀects. 
Given the much- improved quality of these studies (relative to a decade ago), 
the mixed patterns of evidence cannot be attributed entirely to bad methods 
or data. Rather, it suggests that the debate has usefully shifted to ques-
tions of how and when resources matter for student outcomes, rather than 
whether they matter at all.
Most evidence on increases in per-  pupil expenditures does not show test 
score improvements for students; however, this lack of impact may reﬂ  ect 
funds being used for ineﬀective interventions such as pull-  out tutoring or 
one- time bonuses. The literature on school ﬁ  nance reforms suggests that the 
subsequent increases in funding in formally low-  spending areas may have 
diminished test score inequality, but our understanding of how these gains 
occurred or failed to occur is surprisingly modest. Further progress rests 
on obtaining a more nuanced understanding of how resources are used in 
speciﬁ  c policy settings.
Class size reduction can have positive eﬀects on student learning, but at 
a substantial cost. There is no shortage of innovative attempts to reform 
curriculum and instruction, but few have been rigorously evaluated. Still, 
it appears that intensive eﬀorts to improve reading skills can successfully 
raise test scores. Computers also are no panacea for schools especially in the 
13. Though the upfront costs of a computer lab and training are relatively high, they are 
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absence of clear instructional goal, but a well- conceived math program that 
integrates computers can demonstrate robust eﬀects in one year.
6.4    Teachers  and  Teaching
Schools spend more on teachers than on any other budget category, and 
there is mounting evidence that these expenditures aﬀect student achieve-
ment. As one example, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) ﬁ  nd that a 
1 standard deviation increase in average teacher quality for a grade raises 
average student achievement in the grade by at least 0.11 standard devia-
tions of the total test score distribution in mathematics and 0.095 standard 
deviations in reading. There is some controversy over the accuracy of using 
regression-  adjusted changes on student test performance as measure of 
teacher eﬀectiveness (Rothstein 2009). However, Kane and Staiger (2008) 
show that regression- based value added estimates of teacher eﬀects are con-
sistent with estimates using random assignment of teachers to classrooms, 
and Boyd et al. (2009) show that the instructional practices of high value 
added teachers diﬀer meaningfully from those of lower value added teachers.
Despite this growing body of research, knowing that teachers vary mean-
ingfully in their eﬀectiveness does not provide a policy roadmap for how to 
increase teacher quality. In this section, we summarize the current knowl-
edge of the eﬀects of three types of policies aimed at improving teacher qual-
ity: wage increases, recruitment, and professional development (see table 6.2 
for a summary of studies).
6.4.1    Wages
Teachers’ choices about jobs are responsive to wages. A large literature 
ﬁ  nds that teachers are more likely to choose teaching when starting wages 
are high relative to wages in other occupations. Approximately 16.5 percent 
of public school teachers who decided to move to another school between 
2003 to 2004 and 2004 to 2005 reported having done so for better salary 
or beneﬁ  ts (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES] Schools and 
Staﬃng Surveys). For those who left teaching in 2004 to 2005, nearly 15 
percent cited salary- related reasons. Teacher wages have increased dramati-
cally over the last forty years. Nevertheless, since the 1970s, they have fallen 
behind salaries in nonteaching jobs for individuals with similar qualiﬁ  ca-
tions. Lawyers, doctors, scientists, and engineers earn substantially more, 
as do managers and sales and ﬁ  nancial service workers (Corcoran, Schwab, 
and Evans 2004). Bacolod (2007) ﬁ  nds that highly qualiﬁ  ed teachers are 
especially sensitive to changes in relative wages. The less teachers are paid, 
relative to professionals, the less likely high-  ability women are to choose 
teaching. The opportunity cost of becoming a teacher, in terms of salary 
forgone in alternative professions, is high. However, teachers likely work Education Reforms    1 5 7
fewer hours and fewer days, at least partially compensating for this forgone 
income.
While the evidence on the eﬀects of wages on teachers’ decisions is per-
suasive, high-  quality evidence on the eﬀects of teacher wage increases on 
students is sparse. Loeb and Page (2000) use state-  level panel data from the 
1960 to 1990 Public Use Microdata Samples from the U.S. Census to exam-
ine changes in teacher wages over time. They identify the eﬀect of wages from 
both changes in relative teacher salaries and changes in only the salaries of 
nonteaching college graduates, the opportunity cost of becoming a teacher. 
The study ﬁ  nds that increases in teacher wages of 10 percent led to a 3 to 4 
percent drop in student dropout rates and a 1 to 2 percent increase in college 
enrollment. The authors’ simple calculations suggest that the beneﬁ  ts of a 
10 percent wage increase would slightly outweigh the costs.
The Loeb and Page (2000) study examines the eﬀects of average wage 
increases, but wage increases can also be targeted to speciﬁ  c needs and 
outcome goals. Conceptually, directly linking wage increases to improved 
outcomes for students is a logical means of maximizing their eﬀects. By 
paying teachers more when their students learn more, performance-  based 
pay creates incentives for teachers to focus their eﬀorts on student learn-
ing, and it can create incentives for the most eﬀective teachers to enter or 
remain in the teaching professions. There are also potential drawbacks of 
performance-  based pay. We do not measure all aspects of student learning 
that we care about, and, thus, by creating incentives to focus on the mea-
sured outcomes, we may be hurting students on unmeasured dimensions. 
Similarly, it is diﬃcult to create performance-  based pay systems that pro-
vide teachers with incentives to treat their students equitably. The reward 
formulas often make it beneﬁ  cial to concentrate more on some students, 
perhaps those who are performing quite close to an achievement cutoﬀ, to 
the detriment of other students. In addition, if cooperation among teachers 
is important to student learning, then performance-  based pay systems can 
have detrimental eﬀects if they reduce incentives for teachers to cooperate.
There is very little solid evidence on performance- based pay in the United 
States, so we brieﬂ  y discuss the higher-  quality and mixed evidence from 
developing countries. Two studies use experimental methods to estimate the 
eﬀects of performance pay for teachers in India and Kenya. Muralidharan 
and Sundararaman (2006) report eﬀects from a randomized experiment in 
500 schools in the rural Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The schools were 
divided into ﬁ  ve groups: the control group, schools with individual teacher 
bonuses tied to student test- score gains, school- based bonuses, teacher aides, 
and extra funds. The average bonus was approximately 4 percent of average 
salary but could reach a maximum of 29 percent for the individual bonuses 
and 14 percent for the school-  based bonuses. The study ﬁ  nds that students 
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other schools. Relative to the control schools, these students gained 0.19 
and 0.12 standard deviations more in math and language tests, respectively.
Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer (2003) implement a smaller experiment in 100 
rural schools in Kenya. In this case, all the bonuses were schoolwide and 
represented approximately 21 to 43 percent of teacher wages. The authors 
found that students in schools with merit bonuses were more likely to pass 
their exams during the two years of the program but that the students did 
not perform better in subsequent years. In addition, the researchers found 
little evidence that teachers increased their eﬀort or focus on instruction as 
a result of the program. It is clearly diﬃcult to generalize from rural India 
and Kenya to schools in the United States. Current performance-  based pay 
programs in Denver, Nashville, and other cities are likely to provide useful 
evidence on this approach in the relatively near future.
6.4.2    Recruitment
Wage changes are a straightforward means of aﬀecting the teacher work-
force, but they are not the only means and they may not be the most cost- 
eﬀective. Teach for America (TFA) and other recruitment programs such as 
the New York City Teaching Fellows have demonstrated that recruitment 
combined with reorganization of the timing of entry requirements for teach-
ing can drastically change the pool of teacher candidates. As an example, for 
the 2006 school year, TFA received approximately 19,000 applications for 
approximately 2,400 openings received, including 10 percent of the senior 
classes at Spelman and Yale and 8 percent of the senior class from the Cali-
fornia Institute of Technology (Teach for America 2006).
Studies of the eﬀects of Teach for America teachers on student achieve-
ment have tended to ﬁ  nd more positive eﬀects in math than in reading or 
English language arts, and more positive eﬀects when comparing TFA teach-
ers to the average teacher in the school, than to teachers who obtained cer-
tiﬁ  cation through traditional teacher education programs. Decker, Mayer, 
and Glazerman (2004) designed a within-  school random assignment study 
in seventeen schools (100 classrooms) during the 2002 to 2003 school year. 
They found that the test scores of students of TFA teachers improved by 
approximately 0.15 standard deviations more in math than those of other 
students in the school. They found no diﬀerence in reading.
Teach for America teachers are paid by the district in which they work 
as are other teachers. However, there are additional program costs. Teach 
for America reports that it must raise $20 million annually to support 1,000 
members in New York City schools (some of which may be reimbursed 
by school districts).14 Of these funds, 21 percent goes to recruitment and 
selection, 21 percent to preservice training, and 27 percent to professional 
14.  See  https:/ / www.teachforamerica.org/ about/ regions/ new_york_city.htm#ﬁ  nancial_
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development. TFA is also a member of AmeriCorps, which provides their 
members with loan forbearance and interest payment on qualiﬁ  ed student 
loans for the two years of participation and an education award of $4,725 
at the end of each year for future educational expenses or to repay quali-
ﬁ  ed student loans. Assuming a typical TFA class size of eighteen (Decker, 
Mayer, and Glazerman 2004), the annual per-  pupil cost of supporting a 
TFA teacher is $1,374 (including TFA’s costs and the AmeriCorps stipend). 
This is roughly $1,800 per 0.2 standard deviation in math scores although it 
bears emphasis that there are no measured reading eﬀects, and these results 
come from comparing TFA teachers to a range of teachers, many of whom 
had very little preservice training.
The Decker study has strong internal validity because students were ran-
domly assigned to teachers within their school. However, the variety of 
non-  TFA teachers in sampled schools facilitates some conclusions, but not 
others. For example, it is clear that TFA teachers perform approximately as 
well in reading and better in math than the other teachers in the school in 
which they teach but not necessarily better than teachers who had fulﬁ  lled 
the traditional requirements for teaching. The eﬀects of TFA teachers also 
may diﬀer across schools and across grade levels, and, thus, the results for 
elementary schools in the Decker study may not reﬂ  ect the eﬀects in other 
contexts.
Several studies have used state and district longitudinal data on students 
to assess whether TFA teachers produce greater test- score gains among their 
students than other teachers: two studies in a Texas district, one in rural 
North Carolina, and two in New York City. These studies conﬁ  rm some of 
the Decker study’s ﬁ  ndings and shed further light on the relative eﬀectiveness 
of TFA teachers. Raymond, Fletcher, and Luque (2001) and Darling- 
Hammond et al. (2005) use data on elementary schools in the same district 
in Texas and ﬁ  nd some positive eﬀects in math but not in reading. Xu, Han-
naway, and Taylor (2008) is the only study of TFA teachers to assess eﬀects 
in high school. The authors ﬁ  nd that rural North Carolina students of TFA 
teachers learn more during the course of the year than students of teachers 
from traditional routes. They estimate that the diﬀerence in eﬀectiveness 
between the routes is approximately equal to twice the diﬀerence between 
the average ﬁ  rst-  year and average second-  year teachers.15
Boyd et al. (2006) study TFA in New York City, comparing TFA teachers 
to teachers who had completed a traditional teacher certiﬁ  cation program. 
They ﬁ  nd that students of TFA teachers gained 0.31 standard deviations 
less in English language arts and about the same in math as traditionally 
certiﬁ  ed teachers in the same schools, though students of TFA teachers did 
15. There is not a large enough sample size of TFA teachers in North Carolina high schools 
to separate the eﬀects by subject area and the results are an average of teachers in algebra I, 
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have greater learning gains in math than other not-  traditionally-  certiﬁ  ed 
teachers, such as those who entered teaching through individual evaluation, 
emergency certiﬁ  cation, and other alternative routes.
Teach for America teachers largely replace other not-  traditionally- 
prepared teachers, so the comparison with traditionally prepared teach-
ers may not be the most policy-  relevant comparison. As an example, in 
the Decker, Mayer, and Glazerman (2004) experimental study, while only 4 
percent of TFA teachers reported having spent ten or more weeks student 
teaching compared with 31 percent of other teachers with three or fewer 
years of experience, all TFA teachers had at least four weeks of student 
teaching experience during their summer institute, while over half of other 
novice teachers had no student teaching experience. Boyd et al. (Forthcom-
ing) found that as a result of eliminating emergency certiﬁ  cation and imple-
menting intensive recruitment eﬀorts through the New York City Teaching 
Fellows program and, to a lesser extent, through TFA, the gap between the 
qualiﬁ  cations of teachers in high-  poverty schools and low-  poverty schools 
narrowed substantially between 2000 and 2005. The authors estimate that 
this change in measured qualiﬁ  cations of teachers alone is likely to have 
improved the test-  score performance of students in the poorest schools 
approximately 0.03 standard deviations, about half the diﬀerence between 
being taught by a ﬁ  rst-  year teacher and a more-  experienced teacher.
6.4.3    Professional  Development
Recruitment programs such as TFA concentrate on new teachers, but a 
variety of professional development policies aim to improve the eﬀectiveness 
of teachers already in the classroom. The average eﬀect of these policies and 
programs are not promising. In a summary of this research, Hill (2007, 121) 
writes, “there is little evidence that the system of professional development, 
taken as a whole, improves teaching and learning in the United States.” In 
one of the best large- scale studies, given its reliance on discontinuity assign-
ment, Jacob and Lefgren (2004) ﬁ  nd little evidence that in- service programs 
in Chicago aﬀected student performance in either math or reading.
There is little argument that professional development programs, on 
average, have not had positive eﬀects on students. Exceptions to this rule 
seem to appear only when programs are concentrated and intensive. Yoon 
et al. (2007) reviewed more than 1,300 studies of professional development 
programs. Of these, only nine met the standards established by the Depart-
ment of Education’s What Works Clearinghouse for estimating causal 
eﬀects. Combining the results from these studies, the authors conclude 
that concentrated professional development opportunities—in this case, 
programs that required an average of forty-  nine hours of teacher partici-
pation—can improve student achievement by approximately 21 percentile 
points, or approximately 0.55 standard deviations for a student starting at 
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Carpenter et al. (1989) is one example of the studies meeting the criteria in 
the Yoon report. They randomly assigned forty ﬁ  rst- grade teachers to either 
a control group or a month-  long workshop focused on children’s develop-
ment of problem-  solving skills in addition and subtraction. Teachers in the 
control group participated in workshops focused on nonroutine problem 
solving. The program required teachers to attend twenty workshop hours a 
week for four weeks during the summer and one brief meeting in October, 
taught by two professors and three graduate students. The researchers found 
that teacher in who participated in the workshop taught problem solving 
signiﬁ  cantly more and number facts signiﬁ  cantly less than did control teach-
ers. Students were given a standardized mathematics achievement pretest 
in September and a series of posttests in April and May. Students in the 
treatment group scored approximately 0.4 standard deviations higher on the 
posttest (the Iowa Test of Basic Skills). This diﬀerence, though large, was 
not statistically signiﬁ  cant; however, on the subscore of complex addition 
and subtraction, the treatment groups did score a statistically signiﬁ  cant 0.5 
standard deviations higher.
Using a pretest- posttest design and some random assignment, Saxe, Gear-
hart, and Nasir (2001) also found positive eﬀects of professional develop-
ment interventions for mathematics teaching. They compared three sets of 
classrooms studying a unit on fractions. Two sets used the same reform cur-
riculum, but the teachers in one group were randomly assigned to participate 
in an integrated professional development program, while the teachers in 
the other group had no organized professional development although they 
met regularly to discuss implementation of the curriculum. The professional 
development included a ﬁ  ve-  day summer institute and thirteen additional 
meetings. A third set of classroom teachers, not randomly assigned, used a 
traditional curriculum. The study analyzed changes in conceptual under-
standing and computation. They found no diﬀerence between groups on the 
computation scale but did ﬁ  nd systematic variation on the conceptual scale, 
with the reform group receiving professional development scoring substan-
tially higher, more than a standard deviation, than the other two groups.
6.4.4    Summary
The evidence shows that policies aimed at inﬂ  uencing who becomes a 
teacher and what teachers do once they enter the classroom can change the 
teacher workforce and student outcomes. Wages inﬂ  uence teachers deci-
sions; recruitment inﬂ  uences the pool of interested candidates; professional 
development, in some instances, can change teachers’ behaviors and student 
outcomes. This said, we know little about the optimal design of teacher 
policies.
Across the board wage increases are extremely expensive. Among 3.5 mil-
lion teachers staﬀ classrooms in the United States, even a small across-  the- 
board increase in wages is a huge expense. Targeted wage changes are more 164        Susanna Loeb and Patrick J. McEwan
promising but diﬃcult to design, given the many factors that inﬂ  uence a 
student’s learning in a given year, the multitude of dimensions of learning 
that we care about (only some of which we measure), and the diﬃculty 
of designing a reward system that beneﬁ  ts students equitably. Recruitment 
programs have dramatically changed the teaching force, particularly in large 
urban districts. Such approaches are likely to be a part of any eﬀective com-
prehensive plan to improve teaching, but they only aﬀect the pool of new 
teachers (not the substantial number of individuals already teaching), and 
the evidence on how to select the best teachers from this growing pool of 
candidates is sparse. Finally, it is evident that professional development can 
improve student performance but that this professional development must 
be both intensive and targeted on speciﬁ  c tasks. Designing professional 
development that works on a large scale is a daunting task.
6.5      School Choice and Accountability
Even if endowed with suﬃcient resources, schools may not have incentives 
to use their money wisely, and they may be focusing on student outcomes 
that parents and communities do not value. Two sets of policies aim to 
realign incentives in order to improve opportunities for students: test- based 
accountability programs and market-  based accountability programs.
In test-  based accountability schemes, governments measure schools’ 
achievement, judge whether they are successful, and attach a variety of 
rewards or sanctions to these judgments (Figlio and Ladd 2008).16 The best 
known of these policies is the Federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) law 
of 2001, which required schools to make “adequate yearly progress” toward 
100 percent student proﬁ  ciency. But even before NCLB, many states and 
large cities had implemented accountability policies, which coexist with 
NCLB in states like California. Studies using pre-  NCLB, cross-  state varia-
tion in the timing of these state laws suggest some positive eﬀects on test 
scores (Carnoy and Loeb 2002; Hanushek and Raymond 2005). Research 
within states has generally been limited in its ability to identify convincing 
comparison groups against which to compare the outcomes of students sub-
jected to accountability provisions (Figlio and Ladd 2008).17 The strongest 
16. Conceptually, measuring “success” involves estimating the causal eﬀect of thousands of 
individual schools on test scores. In practical terms, accountability systems measure either the 
level of student performance in a given year and compare it a speciﬁ  ed goal (e.g., the Federal 
No Child Left Behind law) or measure changes in schools’ or students’ performance between 
years (e.g., California’s state accountability scheme). The dilemma in either case is that schools 
might be held accountable for variance in test score measures that is due to factors beyond 
schools’ control (e.g., family poverty or randomness in test score ﬂ  uctuations from year to year).
17. One exception is a range of studies that examine eﬀects of accountability pressures on 
schools judged to be failing in Florida. These studies, which use variants of discontinuity 
design, based on the formula for calculating “failure,” suggest that test scores improved in these 
schools. See Rouse and Barrow (2008) and the citations therein.Education Reforms    1 6 5
study uses variation in accountability pressures across schools in Florida 
and shows that schools facing greater pressure were more likely to implement 
a range of new instructional practices such as lengthening instructional time, 
focusing more on low-  performing students, and improving low-  performing 
teachers. Moreover, improvements in student achievement in the schools are 
likely the result of these policy changes (Rouse et al. 2007).
Market-  based policies constitute a second approach to holding schools 
accountable. Broadly speaking, these policies enhance the ability of par-
ents to choose a preferred public or private school. In so doing, they create 
incentives for school authorities to cater to parental preferences for certain 
features of schools and their students. There is already much choice through 
families’ choice of residence and its neighborhood public school, which 
already creates competition (Hoxby 2000a; Rouse and Barrow 2008). But 
moving costs are high, and not all parents have the resources and informa-
tion needed to move to the neighborhood of their preferred school. Vari-
ants of other choice policies, such as private school vouchers and charter 
schools, are grafted onto this system of residential choice. The next two 
sections consider recent evidence on the eﬀects of each policy on student 
outcomes.
6.5.1    Private  School  Vouchers
Private school vouchers are tuition coupons that students can redeem at 
a participating private school. In the few existing U.S. programs, voucher 
eligibility is typically restricted to small numbers of low-  income students, 
and the participating schools are mostly Catholic (except on the occasions, 
such as the early phases of the Milwaukee program, when sectarian partici-
pation was restricted). The accompanying research has thus attempted to 
identify test score eﬀects on low-  income students who are oﬀered or actu-
ally use a voucher to attend such private schools. A separate literature, not 
considered here, considers how to estimate the general equilibrium eﬀects 
of large school voucher plans.18
In the 1980s, when voucher plans were mostly hypothetical, authors used 
nonexperimental methods and data to estimate the eﬀect of Catholic school 
attendance on test scores. This literature, reviewed by McEwan (2000) and 
Neal (2002), showed no or very small eﬀects on test scores but more substan-
tial eﬀects on eventual high school attainment. Its results were somewhat 
inconclusive because of concerns that omitted variables like student motiva-
tion or ability were biasing estimates of private school eﬀects.
As publicly and privately funded voucher programs were implemented in 
several U.S. cities, the evidence base improved. In 1990, Milwaukee’s Parental 
18. The most compelling evidence on large-  scale voucher plans is only available from coun-
tries like Chile that have actually implemented such plans (McEwan 2001; Hsieh and Urquiola 
2006). For reviews of the wider literature on vouchers, see McEwan (2000), Zimmer and Bet-
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Choice Program began oﬀering vouchers of $2,446 (later increased) to 
low-  income students for attendance at nonsectarian schools (Witte 2001). 
Subsequent versions of the program included more students and private 
schools, but the best research was conducted in the program’s early phase. 
Rouse (1998) compared achievement gains of students oﬀered vouchers to 
gains of two comparison groups: a random sample of low-  income students 
in Milwaukee Public Schools and, more compellingly, a group of unsuccess-
ful applicants who were randomly denied admission to private schools. The 
results consistently suggested no statistically signiﬁ  cant eﬀects on reading 
scores and small annual eﬀects on math scores of no more than 0.11 stan-
dard deviations (Rouse and Barrow 2008).
Privately funded voucher programs have been implemented and evalu-
ated with randomized experiments in several U.S. cities (Howell and Peter-
son 2002; Rouse and Barrow 2008). Most prominently, a New York City 
program oﬀered $1,400 to poor children for private school attendance 
(if necessary, families were expected to contribute further toward private 
school tuition). Beginning in Fall 1997, a random subset of eligible appli-
cants was oﬀered vouchers and followed for three years by researchers. Two 
independent analyses found no eﬀects of voucher oﬀers on test scores after 
three years in the full sample of students (Mayer et al. 2002; Krueger and 
Zhu 2004). The ﬁ  rst study did ﬁ  nd eﬀects among the subsample of African 
American students. Krueger and Zhu found that this result disappeared 
when using the full sample of data and alternative methods of deﬁ  ning 
student race in the sample.
The best recent evidence of voucher eﬀects is from the randomized evalua-
tion of a federally funded voucher program in Washington, D.C. (the Oppor-
tunity Scholarship Program). The scholarships are worth up to $7,500 and 
can be used to cover tuition, fees, and transportation to any participating 
private school. As in New York City, the vouchers were restricted to poor 
students and were awarded by lottery. After two years, the eﬀect of the 
voucher oﬀer on math scores is close to zero, and the reading estimates are 
0.05 to 0.08 standard deviations, but none of these are statistically diﬀerent 
from zero at the 5 percent level (Rouse and Barrow 2008; Wolf et al. 2008).
6.5.2    Charter  Schools
Charter schools are publicly funded schools of choice that enjoy some 
degree of autonomy from local school authorities. They receive state or local 
funding based on the number of students that they attract. If they receive 
more applications than spaces, then students are usually admitted by lottery. 
Charter schools are not a homogeneous “treatment.” In the 2007 to 2008 
school year, forty states and the District of Columbia had enacted charter 
school laws with wide variation in charter authorization, ﬁ  nance, regula-
tion, and accountability (Bifulco and Bulkley 2008). Currently, about 4,100 Education Reforms    1 6 7
charter schools enroll 1.2 million children (2 percent of the total) although 
they are concentrated in a small number of states.19
The best research to date has focused on particular states or cities and 
has followed one of two evaluation approaches, each with drawbacks. The 
ﬁ  rst set of studies takes advantage of large samples of administrative data 
from states that track all students’ test scores over time. The authors of 
these studies identify the subset of students that switch between public and 
charter schools and compare their test scores, before and after, to the non-
switching comparison group.20 They are generally consistent in their ﬁ  nd-
ings, despite being conducted in Texas, North Carolina, Florida, and two 
large California cities (Hanushek et al. 2007; Bilfulco and Ladd 2006; Sass 
2006; Zimmer and Buddin 2006). Switching to charter schools often has 
negative eﬀects, usually small, on student test scores (see table 6.3). They 
tend to be largest when the charter school is relatively new and closer to 
zero otherwise. The generalizability of these eﬀects is uncertain because 
they refer only to students that switch between grades and not students who 
both start and complete their schooling in charter schools. In a more recent 
report including more than 70 percent of charter school enrollment across 
the country Center for Research on Education Outcomes ([CREDO] 2009) 
compares students in charter schools with students in nearby public schools 
and ﬁ  nds similar results to those in the preceding: charter schools vary in 
their eﬀectiveness with some better than the average local public school and 
some worse; however, on average, student achievement gains are somewhat 
lower in charter schools.
A second set of studies, using a more convincing approach to causal infer-
ence, relies on the fact that charter schools are usually required to admit 
students by lottery when faced by excess demand. Hoxby and Rockoﬀ (2004) 
compare the test score outcomes of students who won or lost in admissions 
lotteries at three Chicago charter schools. Overall, there were no statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant diﬀerences in reading or math scores between winners or 
losers although this could mask some positive eﬀects in earlier grades. There 
is little national or state data collected on how many charter schools are 
oversubscribed, though even generous estimates conclude it is only a small 
portion (McEwan and Olsen 2007). By revealed preference of families, over-
subscribed schools are perhaps the most eﬀective of a city’s charter schools. 
Thus, the Chicago results are surprising, but still broadly consistent with 
a more ambitious study that analyzed 194 admissions lotteries at nineteen 
Chicago high schools (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2006). Though not charter 
schools, the high schools allow open enrollments in the same local schooling 
19. National charter school data are regularly compiled by an advocacy group, the Center 
for Education Reform (http:/  /  www.edreform.com).
20. Authors apply variants of student ﬁ  xed eﬀects speciﬁ  cations. The exact speciﬁ  cations 
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market. Despite evidence that participating families appear to choose bet-
ter schools along a range of measures like test scores, the authors do not 
any evidence that lottery winners experience beneﬁ  ts on a wide range of 
achievement measures.
Recent lottery research in New York City has turned up very diﬀerent 
results. Hoxby and Murarka (2007) use multiple lotteries for charter schools 
in New York City and ﬁ  nd modest annual test- score gains in both math (0.09 
standard deviations) and reading (0.04 standard deviations) for students 
that actually attend charter schools. Similarly, Dobbie and Fryer (2009) ﬁ  nd 
substantial achievement gains for students attending the charter schools in 
the Harlem Children’s Zone, a ninety-  seven-  block area of central Harlem 
in New York City. In particular, for middle school students, they ﬁ  nd that 
winning a lottery to attend the Promise Academy increases achievement by 
0.73 standard deviations in math and 0.24 in English language arts over three 
years, with most of the gains in the third year. The New York City results 
provide convincing evidence that some charter schools are very eﬀective. It 
is quite possible that oversubscribed charter schools in New York City are, 
on average, more eﬀective than other city schools and perhaps many charter 
schools in other states. The results highlight the fact that charter school poli-
cies across states, and the schools themselves, are quite heterogeneous and 
prevent easy generalizations about eﬀectiveness or costs.
6.5.3    Summary
One premise of choice and accountability is that public schools lack incen-
tives to use resources eﬃciently. In the logic of test-  based accountability 
systems, this ineﬃciency may arise from poor management or from schools 
aiming to produce outcomes other than test scores for students. In choice 
systems, the ineﬃciency could similarly be due to poor management or to 
schools aiming to produce outcomes that parents do not care as much about. 
In either case, there is underproduction of student outcomes, which are 
presumably valued by parents and society.
Substantial recent research has asked whether test-  based and market 
accountability programs have improved student outcomes. The evidence 
on test-  based accountability programs is mixed. However, it is clear that 
some systems can change school practices and, in turn, aﬀect student 
learning (Rouse et al. 2007). The evidence on the average eﬀects of private 
school vouchers and charter schools is quite mixed. Few studies have shown 
positive and meaningful eﬀects of private school voucher programs. The 
charter school evidence has also shown few positive eﬀects across many 
states, but these results are tempered by recent evidence of successes in 
New York City. As a ﬁ  nal caveat, large-  scale voucher and charter school 
policies may increase competition which, in the long run, can beneﬁ  t 
schools and students. The present research is not well-  suited to uncovering 
these eﬀects.Education Reforms    1 7 1
6.6    Conclusions
We have known for some time that additional years of schooling are a 
good investment, but we know less about how to design education systems 
to use resources to maximize student outcomes. Fortunately, the volume and 
quality of research has accelerated in the past decade. This chapter’s review 
focused on high-  quality evidence on the impact and costs of interventions 
in three areas: direct resource investments, investments in the teacher work-
force, and school choice and accountability.
Among direct investments, there is no consistent evidence that simply 
increasing expenditures will increase test scores although such investments 
can increase achievement if used well. The research on class size reduc-
tion and intensive reading programs like Success for All provide evidence 
of the potential beneﬁ  ts of increased investments. In general, computer- 
assisted instruction is no panacea, though a recent study found it can be 
eﬀective if coherently integrated with instructional goals and intensively 
applied. Among teacher policies, there is some evidence that across-  the- 
board teacher wage increases can improve student outcomes although this 
approach is quite costly. Evidence on targeted wage increase policies (like 
performance pay) is still sparse in the United States. The mounting evidence 
is more consistent in suggesting that popular alternative routes for teacher 
recruitment, such as Teach for America, can raise test scores, at least in math, 
if they replace teachers with few formal qualiﬁ  cations. The vast literature on 
teacher professional development only suggests eﬀects when the programs 
are intensive and targeted at improving speciﬁ  c student outcomes. Finally, 
a growing number of randomized and natural experiments suggest zero or 
very small eﬀects of receiving a private school voucher or gaining admission 
to a public school of choice, except in the emerging evidence on New York 
City charter schools.
This summary masks potentially large variation in the cost-  eﬀectiveness 
of the subset of “eﬀective” programs and policies. Section 6.3 suggested that 
schools might have to invest upward of $10,000 on class size reduction to 
obtain increases in test scores of at least 20 percent of a standard deviation 
in test scores. In other cases, such as Success for All or Teach for America, 
the same test score increases might be obtained for one-  quarter the cost or 
less. Indeed, prior work has found, among a subset of eﬀective interven-
tions, that class size reduction is less cost-  eﬀective than others in raising 
test scores. These include computer-  assisted instruction (Levin, Glass, and 
Meister 1987) and investments in teacher resources (Grissmer et al. 2000).
These results might appear to suggest that class size reduction in not 
a worthwhile investment. However, this can only be judged by convert-
ing test-  score gains into a reasonable estimate of monetary beneﬁ  ts that 
can be weighed against costs. For example, Schanzenbach (2007) assumes 
that class size reduction raises test scores by 0.15 standard deviations and 172        Susanna Loeb and Patrick J. McEwan
that a 1 standard deviation increase in test scores causes annual earnings 
to increase by 20 percent.21 Under these assumptions, class size reduction 
shifts discounted annual earnings upward by 3 percent. Weighed against the 
substantial costs of the Tennessee intervention, the internal rate of return is 
4.8 percent, assuming no real wage growth. Krueger (2003) makes slightly 
diﬀerent assumptions and ﬁ  nds an internal rate of return of 5.2 percent. 
Harris (2007) applies further sensitivity analysis and ﬁ  nds that the internal 
rate of return does not fall below 3 percent, equal to a commonly applied 
discount rate.
The ﬁ  nal chapter of this volume conducts a more careful cost-  beneﬁ  t 
comparison of class size reduction and other interventions. For the moment, 
however, the results illustrate that class size reduction—one of the least 
cost- eﬀective education interventions—can at least pass a basic cost- beneﬁ  t 
test (which only includes only a single category of beneﬁ  ts, private earn-
ings). This implies substantial scope for identifying other economically rea-
sonable investments in the quality of education. However, as the chapter’s 
review suggested, the research literature still has far to go in separating the 
eﬀective investments from the ineﬀective and in thinking carefully about how 
to scale-  up pilot interventions.
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